Essay / TIME
What will follow will be the outline of Edmund Husserl’s concept of structure of time – consciousness with reference to selected inspiring philosophical thoughts throughout history. I shall introduce the structure of time-conscience using Husserl’s time diagram, drawing the historical inspirations from selected fragments of Heraclites, Plato and Augustine’s heritage.
In doing so I am not after any inconsequent comparison across centuries, but after: (1) the exposition of the contrast between different ways of conceptualization and the thereby ensuing difference in proposing solutions to the issues of time in philosophy and (2) the description of what turns out to be the unifying element in such a comparison.
This links to our opening thesis: What unifies the different ways of conceptualization of the issue of time is, above all, the interest of a philosopher to deal with the dynamic nature of his own experience with the world, with the issues of his own identity, which is not the identity of a constant substance, but as it is of dynamic nature, thereby being somewhat questionable. This peculiar character – a mystery – of time, stems out of the need to harmonize concepts of two contradictory principles – identity (stability, long-lastingness) and difference (flow of time, dynamics). In our historical excursion we shall follow the context and relations between these two principles, and consequently their presence in Husserl’s time diagram.
First attempt to harmonize the two may be found in the works of Heraclites: fragment B12 states that “those who enter into the same rivers are washed down with ever new waters.” How is that so, the river remaining the same when ever new waters run through it? Plato wondered in a similar fashion when he simplified Heraclites’ thought in his slogan “panta rhei” – all goes on. However, what stability does Heraclites refer to? Could it perhaps be what we have in mind when we say that any experience, any beginning is determined to be time-related? The figure of speech nicely combines the principles of identity and difference – in using the expression “same rivers” Heraclites refers to the time aspect of our experience and in using the expression “ever new waters” he refers to its incessantly dynamic content. In other words, Heraclites identifies time to be a form of continuity linking dynamic contents into a single whole/flow.
Against Heraclites dynamic-static conceptualization of time Plato formulates his image-like conceptualization. It may be briefly summarized as follows: reality is stable, its experiential image is not. Memorable and to some degree fatal chorismos in the Faidón dialogue introduced a new feature into philosophical investigation of time as well. “What we refer to as being time is a changing image of infinity that lasts in harmony with movement determined by numbers,” stated Plato in Timaios. (Plato, Timaios,36a) This is yet again an attractive metaphor. The principle of identity, however, is brought out under the term infinity and the principle of difference Plato links with motion. Certainly, each term represents a problem. We shall nonetheless stick to brevity and will call for assistance professor Patočka’s examinations of psyché, kinésis and zoe in Plato´s Sophist.
A soul comprises being, identity and difference (variety). Unlimited (apeiron) variety is in this mixture firmly linked by certain degree/determination (number). Since in Plato, movement is unity of contradictions, a soul so composed has to be in motion. We may summarize this by saying that a soul is a numerical (mathematical) expression of movement. It is on the divide between what is stable and what moves. In other words, a soul is what mediates between the stability of the number, or more generally of ideas, and the dynamics of being, which may be space or individual soul depending on the context. This mediation is a particular type of motion/process, presuming certain continuity, different from that of the continuity of numbers as well as from the continuity of the mere size of the space. Motion of a soul may be characterized by its own continuity incorporating different phases amongst one another, “moving from the same, the identical toward the different thereby retaining the first phase.” (compare Patočka, 1964; 36) Taking into account that according to Plato even cosmos has a soul, we may summarize that Plato – as opposed to relatively simple characteristic of Heraclites to whom time was a form of continuity linking dynamic experiential content – elevated time to metaphysical heights. In Plato’s multilayer, rationally structured universe of being, time is a form mediating relations between infinity – the principle of identity and motion – the principle of difference, so that “entities to whom this was suited, gained participation at the concept of number, identifying it within the circulation of identity and variety.” (Plato,Timaios 39b)
Our historical expedition shall be concluded by Augustine, thinker whose thoughts about time in the IX. Book of Confessions must be – according to Husserl – “studied by anyone who whishes to deal with the problem of time.” (Husserl, 1966; 9) “Woe is me”, we hear Augustine’s desperate complaint when asking for enlightenment in order to resolve the problem of time. “I know that I speak this in time, and that having long spoken of time, that very “long” is not long, but just duration of time. How then know I this, seeing I know not what time is? Or is it perchance that I know not how to express what I know? Woe is me, that do not even know, what I know not.“ (Augustine, 1990; 407) Nonetheless, what he does know is that if nothing flowed there would be no past and if things would not keep coming there would be no future and if nothing were now, there would be no presence. Augustine’s Confessions perhaps best attest to our initial thesis that conceptualization of the issue of time is backed by the interest of a philosopher to make peace with issues of his own identity. Augustine exposes his past to his inner sight in order to understand what he did not know before his actual conversion – specifically, that God’s mercy has been continually resting on him. The issue that Augustine stresses is the issue of memory, the interconnection of time and forgetting. “Memory is what makes me myself, without it I would not be myself.” (Augustine, 326) Augustine exposes principles of identity and variety in his deliberations about memory and forgetting, while the medium of their combination and harmonization is the soul of a human being. Our soul has the capacity to presently remember the past and to expect the future. “Time,” he says, “is nothing but a certain extension – I am not sure of what – but of what else than of soul in and of itself.” (Augustine, 405)
Let us summarize: we described Heraclites attempt as dynamic-static. To him, the principle of identity is the existence of time proper (“the same river”) and the principle of variety is its characteristic (“ever new waters”). We refer to the Plato’s way of conceptualization of time as being image-like. To him, the principle of identity operates under the term infinity, while the principle of variety is linked to motion [1]. Additionally, for Plato, time also fulfilled the function of a certain “ontological constant” linking cosmos (macro level) to psyché (micro level). Both spoke on the issue of time rather briefly, using metaphors. In comparison with the two, Augustine does not rely on semantically rich metaphors, devoting the entire book XI. of his Confessions to time. To him, the problem of time is the problem of our own identity, problem of memory and forgetting. It is an internal human issue, his conceptualization being in line with that – let us call it psychological.
Unlike Augustine, Edmund Husserl does not ask himself: “What time is?” in his thinking. We never experience time as such and that is why he does not search for the very nature of time. Nonetheless, our experience is always time-related. What he asks is what makes time-consciousness possible, how we can understand it. When we remember something, a past content from an experiential fact overlaps with current remembering. We are aware of content identity of these two acts which are separate in time. Husserl’s question relevant for such a situation is: “From where, or better yet, how we not know that?” In the following text we shall present an outline of the structure of time consciousness – that is Husserl’s conceptualization of the issue of time.
As Husserl states in Logical Examinations, we can refer to consciousness in three senses:
1. Consciousness as the overall realistic phenomenological duration of the empirical “I”, as the synthesis of psychical experiences within the singularity of experiential stream;
2. Consciousness as the insight into one’s own psychical experience;
3. Consciousness as a summative denomination of varied “psychical acts” or “intentional experiences.” (Husserl, 1992; 356)
Speaking of the structure of time consciousness, we refer to the certain conceptual structure that enables us to explain, for example, the duration of any time object – in this respect Husserl uses the example of a melody in music.
One of the senses (hearing) mediates melody to our consciousness that – as the melody gradually flows – continually keeps bringing together individual phases, constituting sense of a melody. This sense means that even what no longer appears therein turns out to be preserved as valid in the course of consequent phases, for it is preserved in primary memory (retained thought), while simultaneously the anticipated expectations of the future (potential anticipation) is more precisely defined and occurs. In this manner, in the continuity of perceptual and conscience experiences gained we procure evidence of the melody. But how can it be that one individual perception continually changesinto another? Within this continuous change, how individual and thereby in a certain sense discrete contents of consciousness are formed? Any cognitive act produces unique content, while occupying and retaining its place in the time sequence (if A precedes B in perception, it will be the same if accurately remembered). How can we describe and philosophically explain the cognitive process which is neither a “rhapsody of perceptions” nor a single great “deja vu”?
Any new current perception is immediately linked to the presence. Nonetheless, certain notion of the past and certain future expectations are always somehow naturally present. What is (primary) memory? Certain form of conscience of the past, in some way memories contain past perceptions. However, how is the picture of the past perception constituted in my mind in the very present time of now?
As an explanation, Husserl offered his so called time diagram:
The horizontal axis m stands for the sequence of individual moments now following one another, which we may perceive as abstract moments filling some process (for instance of perceiving a musical melody). Line t0t4 represents a given time period of this process. Any now as a point in time is – according to Husserl – a source of the dual focus of consciousness. Horizontal intention at point t0 is directed to a new content at point t1 (to the next tone), at the same time, however, the content of the point t0 does not disappear immediately thanks to the diagonal intention directed toward point t10. To any now point in time is linked a vertical series – these stand for the sequence of content retentions of the given point in time on the horizontal axis. Constant lower index with every point t stands for the fact that every point on the vertical axis is the retention modification of the given content of the recent now from the horizontal sequence and these points keep being further modified – the gradual layering of such modification is expressed by the changing upper index by each t. Point t4 represents the abstract moment of absolute now. The vertical axis n stands for the sequence of retention modifications that evolved from the current now, i.e. from point t4 – representing the line between retention and protention. Husserl refers to points t0, t1, t2, t3, t4 to be the original impressions, in our example, the currently sounding tone is its content. In parallel with the original impressions, there is the given continuity of retentions of the previous ones (“memory tail as if of a comet”). Husserl’s time diagram captures the passing of individual now in time along with their retentive modification. This double motion is expressed in the diagram through the diagonal axis e. Vertical axis i stands for the intensity of the content of the original impression in the consciousness: the lower the upper index, the lower the intensity, the content of the original impression disappearing in the past. Having crossed a certain limit, the content of the original impression is not longer defined by the retention, but on the basis of reproduction (secondary memory). The p area stands for the sphere of protention. The q area is also a sphere of the possible – it is, nonetheless, somewhat of “past future” – a sphere of potential that was offered in the past as protentions but failed to have been carried out. We may call it „alternative past“. The continuous area marked by connections between points t0-t4-t40 may be understood as what Husserl at one point refers to as “time-court” (Zeithof) – the continuous sphere filled with contents of original impressions and their modifications through immediate retentions, all of it, so to speak immediately present, in the conscience.
As mentioned above, Husserl describes the structure of time consciousness through differentiating between horizontal and diagonal intentionality. “In a single stream of consciousness, two inseparable yet unite intentionalities intertwine as two sides of the very same thing, mutually requiring one another. Through one (the horizontal one – F.B.) the immanent time, the objective time, the true time is constituted, encompassing duration and changes to what endures; through the second (the diagonal one – F.B.) the quasi-time order of the phases of the stream is constituted.” (Husserl, 1966; 80) Through the first, the new conscience content is formed, through the second the belonging of the given content in the stream is constituted. In our diagram, the m axis stands for the source of horizontal intentionality and the n axis is the source of diagonal intentionality. And it is the dichotomy of the character of intentionality that may be regarded as Husserl’s solution to the contradiction of the two principles we identified in Heraclites, Plato and Augustine’s thoughts. The principle of identity Husserl calls diagonal intentionality which is operative in the form of the object focused intention (the content of original impression). The principle of difference Husserl calls horizontal intentionality – this one operates in the form of intentions focused on an ever new content. The two intentionalities and the combination and interaction thereof fill, or better constitute the continual sphere of consciousness. Extreme case of diagonal intentionality – exclusive employment of the principle of identity – would eliminate the synthesizing activity of the horizontal intentionality (involving new contents which would hypothetically equal to a time caesura). The opposite would be represented by the extreme case of the horizontal intentionality – exclusive employment of the principle of difference – would lead to a total separation from the sense kept in retention (activity of involving new contents without the capacity to distinguish their placement in time ceases to be a synthesizing activity and strictly speaking would lead to destruction of consciousness).
We can see that Edmund Husserl’s conceptualization of the issue of time is rather unique in comparison with classical authors. I shall denominate his conceptualization technical in that it requires following of many distinctions and using technical terms. The actual distinguishing between the horizontal and vertical intentionality happens after a long journey through a labyrinth of other phenomenological distinctions (for instance between real and ideal, abstract and concrete content, between perception and perception content, between primary and secondary memories, objective and immanent time and so forth). In opposition to the metaphorical expression of Heraclites and Plato, or the literary style of Augustine’s diary notes that all directly invite to join interpretation with readers’ own imaginativeness, thanks to that their conceptualizations of time being intuitively understandable, Husserl requires discipline. He himself referred to phenomenology as to „Arbeitsphilosophie“, aiding himself with geometrical diagram instead of a metaphor.
Despite the contrast among the above conceptualizations we uncovered a shared feature of the philosophical attempts to understand the issue of time. It is the effort to harmonize the principle of identity with the principle of difference, to overcome the tension between what is stable and what changes.